February 12, 2009

Expected Release
10:00 a.m.

Thomas F. Gimble
Principal Deputy Inspector General
Department of Defense

before the
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs

on

“DoD IG Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Control and Accountability; Security Assistance; and Sustainment for the Afghan National Security Forces”
Chairman Tierney and distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this morning to discuss our report on the “Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Control and Accountability; Security Assistance; and Sustainment for the Afghan National Security Forces.” In addition to detailing our report, I will also briefly discuss lessons learned in Iraq that can be applied to Afghanistan.

As this committee knows, the DoD Office of the Inspector General (DoD IG) has the primary responsibility within the Department of Defense for providing oversight of defense programs and funds appropriated to the Department at home and around the world, to include Southwest Asia. In this role, the DoD IG oversees, integrates, and attempts to ensure there are no gaps in the stewardship of DoD resources. We spearhead the DoD oversight community in auditing, investigating, and inspecting accountability processes and internal controls, in areas such as acquisition, contracting, logistics, and financial management. We also work in close partnership, through the Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group and the International Contract Corruption Task Force (ICCTF), with other oversight organizations, such as the Government Accountability Office, the Special Inspectors General for Iraq and Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGIR and SIGAR), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, the Department of State Office of Inspector General, and the U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General.

Adequate management controls and oversight to verify that proper safeguards are in place and working as intended are essential to reduce or eliminate waste, fraud and abuse. Severely lacking controls or minimal proper oversight creates opportunities for corruption, fraud, waste, and abuse. Additionally, individuals must be held accountable for violating laws and regulations and for mismanagement of DoD resources.
Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Control and Accountability; Security Assistance; and Sustainment for the Afghan National Security Forces.

Background

At the request of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the DoD IG performed an assessment in Iraq, during September and October 2007, concerning the accountability and control of the Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) the U.S. was supplying the Iraq Security Forces. In addition, the assessment team reviewed the effectiveness of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program in supporting U.S. strategic objectives in Iraq and assessed the effectiveness of U.S. support to the Iraq Security Forces in helping them build their logistics sustainment base. The results of that assessment and recommendations for corrective actions were published in DoD IG Report No. SPO-2008-001, “Assessment of the Accountability of Arms and Ammunition Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq,” July 3, 2008.

In preparation for the Iraq munitions assessment, the team visited Afghanistan for a week to review the accountability and controls of munitions the U.S. was supplying the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

Initiation of the 2008 Afghanistan Assessment. The Inspector General assembled a second assessment team in February 2008 to return to Iraq to determine the status of corrective actions being implemented as a result of the recommendations in our July 3, 2008 munitions assessment report. A decision was made to include Afghanistan in this second assessment to build on the work accomplished during our September/October 2007 visit. The assessment team deployed to Afghanistan in April 2008 and then to Iraq.
The overall objective of the Afghanistan assessment, announced on April 4, 2008, was to determine whether the controls over the distribution of conventional military arms, ammunition, and explosives provided to the ANSF were adequate. The additional objectives of the Afghanistan assessment were to:

- Determine whether security assistance processes were responsive to ANSF equipment requirements. Specifically, we examined the organizational structure and processes used to execute security assistance programs during wartime operations using pseudo FMS cases for Afghanistan.

- Assess whether the ANSF logistics sustainment base was being effectively developed. Specifically, we examined the status and effectiveness of planning to develop a sustainable Afghan logistics base.

- Assess the development of the Afghan military health care system and its sustainment base.

Results

As the assessment team redeployed from Afghanistan, the Principal Deputy Inspector General out-briefed the field commanders on the preliminary observations and recommendations, enabling the Command to initiate immediate corrective action. The results and recommendations for corrective actions were published in DoD IG Report No. SPO-2009-001, “Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Control and Accountability; Security Assistance; and Sustainment for the Afghanistan National Security Forces,” October 24, 2008. The report contained 23 observations and 71 recommendations with 6 observations and 15 recommendations specifically addressing the accountability and control of AA&E.
The report’s results are separated into four parts: AA&E, FMS, Logistics Sustainability, and Medical Sustainability.

**Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives.** The mission of the AA&E logistics supply chain is to provide an effective end-to-end system that delivers AA&E materiel to the warfighter, while maintaining the security and safety of the materiel and the public. Inherent in this mission is the requirement to implement mechanisms throughout the supply chain that ensure accountability and control of AA&E while enabling mission execution.

The assessment team found that the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) had not issued implementing instructions or procedures governing the accountability, control, and physical security of AA&E the U.S. was supplying to ANSF. Further, CSTC-A had not clearly defined the missions, roles, and responsibilities of U.S. training teams and senior mentors involved in advising ANSF and the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior on the accountability, control, and physical security of U.S.-supplied AA&E. Moreover, the CSTC-A had not accurately recorded the serial numbers of weapons that were to be issued to ANSF and did not report these serial numbers to the DoD Small Arms/Light Weapons Serialization Program.

The CSTC-A needed to issue command policy guidance and implementing instructions or procedures for the accountability, control, and physical security of AA&E the U.S. was supplying to ANSF. Further, it was necessary that CSTC-A develop a formal mentoring strategy with detailed implementing guidance for mentoring ANSF and the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior on the accountability, control, and physical security of U.S.-supplied AA&E. In addition, CSTC-A needed to ensure that serial numbers and associated information in its data systems used to track weapons were accurate and, in addition, report the
weapons serial number information to the DoD Small Arms/Light Weapons Serialization Program.

**Foreign Military Sales.** The U.S. and Afghan governments have used equipment supplied through U.S. FMS “pseudo” cases as the primary means to equip and train ANSF. The pseudo-FMS cases used U.S. Title 10 U.S.C. funds (rather than recipient country funds) appropriated to the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund to purchase equipment, although the cases operate administratively under standard security assistance rules and procedures.

The U.S. FMS efforts have historically functioned primarily as a peacetime security assistance program. However, the U.S. is using FMS pseudo-case processes as the principal means to equip, expand, and modernize ANSF during wartime conditions. This security assistance approach to Afghanistan needs to be fully supportive of the wartime equipping requirements of CSTC-A and ANSF to be successful in executing this strategic decision. Responsive support beyond the norm is essential for rapid ANSF force generation, replacement of combat losses, and force modernization.

Commanders noted that progress had been made in improving the FMS process responsiveness. However, FMS case processing time standards were developed in peacetime and were still inadequate for meeting the wartime train and equip requirements of CSTC-A and ANSF. Further, the CSTC-A security assistance office was not adequately staffed with sufficient numbers of personnel and those personnel that were assigned did not possess the requisite rank, security assistance skills, and experience required to successfully execute the mission. As a result, the ability of the FMS process and the CSTC-A security assistance office to responsively and effectively accomplish the mission may have been impaired.
The team recommended that a wartime standard for FMS case processing times be established to support U.S. strategic objectives in Afghanistan. In addition, the number of personnel in the CSTC-A security assistance office and the rank level of its leadership had to be increased to be commensurate with the mission, size, and scope of the FMS efforts in Afghanistan.

**Logistics Sustainability.** The ability of ANSF to operate independently relies on developing adequate logistical support for fielded military and police units. This support includes standardized logistics policies and processes; a logistics organization that is able to procure, receive, store, distribute, maintain, and re-supply its forces; maintenance of a sufficient logistical infrastructure; and support of professional logistics training and mentoring activities. The CSTC-A has responsibility for helping ANSF build these capabilities and develop logistics sustainability.

However, the various U.S. plans for development of ANSF logistics sustainment were not clearly linked in a single integrated plan; did not provide a time-phased, conditions-based approach for accomplishing end state objectives; and generally did not identify a specific person or office responsible for the execution of specific tasks. Moreover, it was not clear the extent to which the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior and ANSF were directly engaged in the process of planning the establishment of their own logistics sustainment base.

There were insufficient numbers of logistics mentors assigned to ANSF. And, CSTC-A had not prepared or issued a strategy with formal implementing guidance to its mentors regarding advising Ministry of Defense, Afghan National Army General Staff, and Ministry of Interior logistics organizations for achieving a sustainable logistics capability. Moreover, logistics mentors needed to receive the requisite training to successfully execute their mission.
A single, integrated CSTC-A logistics sustainment plan also needed to be developed in coordination with the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior and ANSF that linked tasks, milestones, and metrics and identified specific accountable staff offices of primary responsibility for each action.

**Medical Sustainability.** Independent, effective ANSF operations will depend on an ANSF health care delivery system that provides acceptable field-level combat casualty care, evacuation of casualties, restorative surgery and rehabilitation, and long-term care for disabled ANSF personnel. A sustainable ANSF health care system depends on achieving an integrated Afghan civil-military-police health care system, in which civilian clinical services, medical education, and medical logistics support ANSF needs. The complexity of medical stabilization and reconstruction challenges in Afghanistan calls for a robust U.S. interagency and international effort to assist deployed medical personnel in developing and implementing a detailed, multi-year strategy and reconstruction plan.

However, lack of coordinated long-term planning and engagement by the U.S. Central Command, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-International Security Assistance Force (NATO-ISAF), CSTC-A, and the U.S. Mission-Afghanistan limited the development of key Afghan civilian health care system capabilities needed to support ANSF. Further, there was confusion among the ANSF medical leadership as to the policy and strategy on integration of Afghan military and police medical functions into a common ANSF medical corps or even whether this was a desirable goal.

Many U.S. and NATO-ISAF medical mentoring teams were not fully manned, particularly those assigned to work with the Afghan police, and the mentors’ inadequate training seriously hampered the development of ANSF
medical personnel. Comprehensive pre-deployment training and in-country orientation programs would significantly boost the effectiveness of medical mentoring personnel.

Moreover, restrictive personnel practices for U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force medical personnel assigned to CSTC-A reduced its ability to relocate them to meet changing work requirements in Afghanistan. In addition, specific, prioritized medical objectives that had been synchronized with the appropriate levels of ANSF medical leadership had not been developed for providing mentoring support to ANSF.

An integrated Afghan civil-military-police health care system may not develop upon which a sustainable ANSF health care system must depend. The lack of an effective ANSF health care system would require prolonged combat casualty care assistance by the U.S. and other NATO-ISAF member countries to ANSF, as well as delay its ability to operate independently.

The U.S. Central Command, in coordination with U.S. Mission-Afghanistan, Afghan medical leadership, NATO-ISAF, and multiple interagency and international partners, needs to develop a comprehensive, integrated, multi-year plan to build a sustainable ANSF health care system. DoD and NATO-ISAF medical mentoring teams need to be fully resourced with adequately trained personnel and supported by an interagency reach back capability that coordinates all U.S. government health sector reconstruction activities in Afghanistan.

**Command Corrective Actions**

In response to the assessment, out-brief and final report, the U.S. Central Command and CSTC-A initiated a number of corrective actions, a few representative examples are detailed below:
• U.S. Central Command issued formal guidance enhancing munitions accountability and control within its area of responsibility. CSTC-A updated standard operating procedures on munitions accountability and control. CSTC-A is also coordinating with the Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Activity organization to develop formal procedures to ensure that serial numbers of weapons provided the ANSF are recorded in the DoD Small Arms/Light Weapons Serialization Program.

• U.S. Central Command initiated action to increase the number of personnel billets within the Security Assistance Office and the rank level of those billets to better align the capability of the office with the mission, size and scope of the security assistance program and level of FMS funding in Afghanistan.

• Further, CSTC-A developed a strategy to improve logistics mentoring communication and coordination by linking its mentors to the ANSF at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

• U.S. Central Command and CSTC-A also agreed to support improved pre-deployment training for medical mentors deploying to Afghanistan.

Recommendations

Prior to publication of the final report, management had concurred with 56 of the 71 recommendations. They have concurred with ten more since the issuance of the final report. The following five recommendations were either rejected or require additional follow-up action.
**Recommendation S.2.** We recommended that the Surgeon General of the Air Force change the Joint Force and ad-hoc medical personnel practices within the U.S. Air Force to ensure that the CSTC-A Command Surgeon has the maximum flexibility necessary to assign Air Force personnel where needed to accomplish the medical mentoring mission in Afghanistan.

**Recommendation U.** We recommended that the Commander, CSTC-A advise the Ministry of Defense and the Afghanistan National Army General Staff that Supply Class VIII medical logistics should remain under the control of the Afghanistan National Army Surgeon General.

**Recommendation W.1.b.** We recommended that the Commander, U.S. Central Command, establish a Command Surgeon position at the grade of O-7 on the staff of the Commander, US Forces-Afghanistan, to proactively coordinate all Defense Department health sector activities in Afghanistan, including:

- Oversight of long-term joint planning, coordination, and development of the ANSF health care system with U.S. Mission-Afghanistan, across all NATO-ISAF components, with NATO-ISAF member nations, and with NATO Allied Command Operations;

  Advocating for resources and authorities to properly develop sustainable civilian health sector capacity where needed to support the ANSF.

- Oversight of ANSF medical mentoring and training across all ISAF components, with NATO-ISAF member nations, and with NATO Allied Command Operations, as further described in Recommendation T.4.

**Recommendation W.1.e.** (This recommendation was originally directed to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. After we evaluated the
management comments, we re-directed it to U.S. Central Command.) We
recommended that the Commander, U.S. Central Command prepare, in
coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, and the Assistant Secretary of
the Army (Financial Management & Comptroller), an Afghanistan Security Forces
Fund spending plan that includes a separate medical budget category and submit to
the United States Congress to request appropriated funding for building and
improving civilian Afghan health care systems that adequately complement and
support the Afghanistan National Security Forces health care system.

**Recommendation W.4.** We recommended that the Deputy Secretary of
Defense designate the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs as the lead
to:

a. Develop policy for all Defense Department stability operations with a
medical component, health-related security and health sector reconstruction
activities, medical capacity building, and medical components of
humanitarian assistance and disaster response actions;

b. Develop policy to form strategic partnerships and cooperative
mechanisms with other U.S. Government agencies for stability operations
with a medical component, health-related security and health sector
reconstruction activities, medical capacity building, and medical
components of humanitarian assistance and disaster response actions;

c. Develop, in cooperation with other U.S. Government agencies and non-
governmental organizations, non-kinetic strategies for Combatant
Commanders and U.S. Embassy country teams to use medical resources in
stability operations with a medical component, health-related security and
health sector reconstruction activities, medical capacity building, and
medical components of humanitarian assistance and disaster response actions.

d. Develop measures of performance and outcomes to meet end state goals;

e. Identify and program for resources required to support these tasks.

Way Forward

A Special Plans and Operations assessment team will return to Afghanistan in March 2009 to determine the status of corrective actions being implemented as a result of the recommendations in our report issued in October 2008 and to initiate new work.

The team will specifically evaluate:

- Strategic planning in Afghanistan by determining whether U.S. government, coalition, and Afghan Ministry of Defense goals, objectives, plans, and guidance to train, equip, and field the expanded Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police are appropriate and sufficiently resourced.

- Whether the current system of accountability and control over munitions U.S. forces are supplying the ANSF is adequate.

- Whether U.S. government, coalition, and Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior goals, objectives, plans, and guidance to develop a sustainable ANSF health care system are issued and operative; and previous DoD IG recommendations regarding developing and sustaining the ANSF health care system have been implemented.
In addition to this assessment team’s work, we are also completing phase III of a series of audits of the Afghanistan National Security Forces. One of the current audits focuses on certain issues related to the accountability of weapons distributed to the Afghanistan National Army and was issued in a draft for management comment on February 11, 2009.

In order to complete assessments, audits, and investigations in Southwest Asia we have adopted a strategy involving permanent staff in-country supplemented by U.S. and Europe-based DoD IG personnel, and visiting teams of auditors, agents, and investigators who serve temporarily in the area as they focus on specific tasks and issues. This is an important part of the DoD IG mission as we attempt to stamp out instances of fraud, waste and abuse in an increasingly heated conflict. We adjust the number of deployed personnel according to the:

- Warfighter’s ability to sustain the size of our presence;
- Priority of work being performed;
- Actual workload demands.

We plan our efforts giving full consideration to operational priorities. We are currently maintaining as small a footprint as possible in theater and will continue to coordinate efforts among audit and investigation agencies. We consider it of utmost importance that our teams are given full access and cooperation and be allowed to enter areas of concern in a timely manner independent of the influence of functional area commanders. During a recent review of ground fuels in Southwest Asia, we ran into problems gaining access to four fuel depots in Afghanistan. The review has been delayed and will contain serious scope limitations due to the lack of access to fuel facilities. Access issues such as this result in an inability for us to report independently or conclusively on
management controls. The difficulties we have experienced transporting audit personnel to logistic centers within Afghanistan is causing us to scale back our expeditionary teams and focus on increasing the number of auditors based in Afghanistan.

In this regard, on January 27, 2009, General Petraeus approved our plans to expand our permanent presence in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, and Qatar. Specifically, we are in the process of increasing our permanent presence in theater from 21 to 36 personnel. This will place 12 individuals in Afghanistan, 17 in Iraq, 5 in Qatar, and 2 in Kuwait. This increased ground presence will allow us to more efficiently and effectively conduct assessments, audits, and investigations in the Central Command Area of Responsibility. Our goal is to have the increased presence in place and functioning by the end of April 2009. We intend to re-evaluate our permanent staff levels periodically in light of a potential draw down in Iraq and an anticipated increased presence in Afghanistan. It will be important to take advantage of lessons learned in each country.

**Common Challenges**

On July 18, 2008, the DoD IG issued a summary report entitled, “Challenges Impacting Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom Reported by Major Oversight Organizations Beginning FY 2003 through FY 2007.” The summary effort compiles 302 reports and testimonies given by the Defense Oversight Community and GAO. Our analysis identified that over the course of conducting Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom, DoD experienced, at times, significant and recurring challenges in:
• Contract Management,
• Contract Oversight,
• Resource Limitations;

• Logistics,
• Asset Accountability and Visibility,
• Equipping of Forces;

• Financial Management,
• Accuracy of Cost Reporting,
• Accountability.

Further, there were challenges that were common in more than one of the functional areas. Specifically, shortfalls in DoD training as well as in policy and procedures were challenges in more than one functional area.

These areas have been reported as challenges within DoD since the early 1990s; so it is not surprising that DoD is experiencing these challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan. DoD has many initiatives underway that we believe address the challenges DoD is experiencing in its Iraq and Afghanistan operations. These DoD initiatives include issuing updates to the Federal Acquisition Regulation and DoD policies regarding the oversight of deployed contractors, increase in oversight of contractors performing logistical support work, deploying Defense Finance and Accounting Service personnel to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait to support the deployed personnel in financial operations, and assessing which
business operations can be removed from the dangerous areas in theater and be performed in safer locations.

**Importance of Coordination.** The DoD IG has the primary responsibility within the Department of Defense for providing oversight of defense programs and funds appropriated to the Department at home and around the world, to include Southwest Asia. In this role, the DoD IG office oversees, integrates, and attempts to ensure there are no gaps in the stewardship of DoD resources. We spearhead the DoD oversight community in auditing, investigating, and inspecting accountability processes and internal controls, in areas such as acquisition, contracting, logistics, and financial management.

**Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group.** The DoD IG jointly established and chairs the interagency Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group. The Joint Planning Group meets quarterly and provides oversight of fraud, waste, abuse, and criminal activities in the Southwest Asia region. The Joint Planning Group allows for coordination and cooperation among the organizations toward the common objective of providing oversight. This unity of effort includes the Military Inspectors General and Service Auditors General, Combatant Commands Inspectors General, the Defense Contract Audit Agency, the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, the Defense Contract Management Agency, the Inspectors General of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development, the SIGIR, and the SIGAR. The mission of the Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group is to better coordinate and integrate oversight activities in the region to identify and recommend improved mission support to military units conducting operations. We used the Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group to facilitate the compilation and issuance of the Comprehensive Audit Plan for Southwest Asia in response to the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181), Section 842, “Investigation of Waste, Fraud,
and Abuse in Wartime Contracts and Contracting Processes in Iraq and Afghanistan,” January 28, 2008. To enhance the oversight awareness of DoD initiatives that impact the contingency operations, the Joint Planning Group invites DoD functional components, such as the Defense Contract Management Agency and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, to brief their respective initiatives.

**Investigative Challenges.** As is the case in Iraq, conducting investigations in Afghanistan is exceptionally complicated. Challenges common to both theaters of operation include the complexity of the fraud or corruption schemes, the multi-national and multi-cultural aspect of investigations involving foreign contractors, and the necessity to work with foreign governments and foreign security forces. Also, criminal activity often crosses venues, with actions in furtherance of a criminal venture occurring in Southwest Asia, the United States, and frequently other countries, and concomitantly with evidence spread throughout. Other difficulties include complicated logistics, use of translators, evaluation of foreign evidence, and hefty costs associated with deploying civilian criminal investigators for extended periods of time. Added to these are the restrictions and dangers associated with operational tempo and persistent insurgent activity, the difficulties in locating witnesses who redeploy or leave military service, and precautious transportation restrictions imposed by the U.S. Forces. Despite these challenges, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), the investigative arm of the DoD IG, and its law enforcement partners have assertively pursued the important mission to investigate DoD-related criminal activity concerning fraud and public corruption and to devote substantial resources to projects and investigations designed to proactively identify potential fraud, waste, and abuse relating to Southwest Asia.
**International Contract Corruption Task Force.** Through conducting investigations in Iraq, investigators have learned it is imperative to utilize a team approach to counter fraud, waste, and abuse, and other crimes associated with contracting such as corruption, conflicts of interest, and major theft. DCIS is but one of several investigative agencies operating within Iraq. DCIS partners with agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command to collectively conduct investigations under the auspices of the ICCTF.

The ICCTF, an offshoot of the National Procurement Fraud Task Force, was formed in November 2006, to specifically target fraud and corruption involving Southwest Asia. The primary goal of the ICCTF is to combine the resources of multiple investigative agencies to effectively and efficiently investigate and prosecute cases of contract fraud and public corruption related to U.S. government spending in Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan. The ICCTF created a Joint Operations Center (JOC) in furtherance of achieving maximum interagency cooperation.

The JOC, which is located in Washington, D.C., serves as the nerve center for the collection and sharing of intelligence regarding corruption and fraud relating to funding for the Global War on Terrorism. The JOC coordinates intelligence-gathering, de-conflicts case work and deployments, disseminates intelligence, and provides analytic and logistical support for the ICCTF agencies to enhance criminal prosecutions and crime-prevention. The JOC is the vital link into the entire intelligence community and provides a repository from which to disseminate intelligence indicative of criminal activity. Case information and criminal intelligence are shared, and accomplishments are reported jointly. The agency heads meet regularly to collectively provide policy, direction, and oversight. The ICCTF is now engaged in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kuwait.
It is anticipated that the SIGAR will join the ICCTF ranks in the immediate future. The other IG partners of the ICCTF are SIGIR, State Department OIG, and USAID OIG.

Closing

We are committed to providing effective and meaningful oversight that assists DoD to address its challenges in conducting operations, safeguarding and deterring taxpayer monies from waste, fraud, and abuse, and most importantly, ensuring our brave military, civilian, coalition, contractors and the Iraqi and Afghanistan citizens supporting a free and sovereign democratic state are as safe as possible. We recognize there is a vast and important mission to support DoD’s efforts and are proud to be part of this historic and important effort. This office is on firm footing to provide the necessary oversight. We thank the Committee for the opportunity to discuss our ongoing efforts and observations regarding Afghanistan and look forwarding to continuing our strong working relationship with all oversight organizations engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan.
APPENDIX

Other DoD Inspector General Efforts in Afghanistan
Investigations

The DCIS has completed 4 investigations related to Afghanistan. Two of the investigations were completed in Afghanistan (one regarding the theft of fuel and one regarding bribery), and the other two were completed in the continental U.S. (one regarding product substitution and one regarding conflict of interest issues).

DCIS has 31 ongoing investigations related to Afghanistan. The chart below provides some insight into the types on ongoing investigations.

6 being worked in Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investigation</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bribery</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bid Rigging</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gratuities (contracting official)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict of Interest</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractor/Subcontractor Kickback</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25 being worked from offices outside of Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investigation</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>False Claims/False Statements</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product Substitution</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost/Labor Mischarging</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bribery: Contracting Official</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal Technology Transfer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted Bribery of a Government Official</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft of Equipment (weapon)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft of Funds</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft of Fuel</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractor/Subcontractor Kickback</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antitrust Violation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism Related Act</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Audit

We have completed 8 audits that directly relate to operations in Afghanistan and have 9 more audits in progress directly relating to Afghanistan. The following are a few examples of completed and ongoing audit work in Afghanistan.

Completed

- Implementation of the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan, February 2007

- Phase I of the audit of the Distribution of the Funds and Validity of Obligations for the Management of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, November 2007

- DoD Support to the NATO International Security Assistance Force, February 2008

- Contractor Support to the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization in Afghanistan, March 2008

- Contingency Construction Contracting Procedures Implemented by the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, September 2008

- Procurement and Use of Nontactical Vehicles at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan, October 2008

- Air Force Real Property Accountability, December 2008
• Distribution of Funds and the Validity of Obligations for the Management of the Afghanistan Security Forces-Phase II, February 2009

**Planned/Ongoing**

• Accountability of Weapons Distributed to the Afghanistan National Army.

• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Real Property Accountability

• Accountability of Equipment Purchased for the Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army.

• Class III Fuel Procurement in Southwest Asia

• Controls Over Contractor Common Access Cards in the U.S. Central Command

• Purchasing and Leasing of Vehicles in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom

• Funds Appropriated for Afghanistan and Iraq Processed Through the Foreign Military Sales Trust Fund

• Management and Accountability of Property Purchased at Regional Contracting Centers in Afghanistan

• Medical Equipment Used to Support Operations in Southwest Asia